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Introduction
Beginning in tax year 1991, U.S. taxpayers may
no longer deduct personal interest expense
when calculating taxable income, thus complet-
ing the transition from the unlimited deducibil-
ity provisions that existed prior to enactment of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86). In tax-speak,
personal interest expense comprises interest pay-
ments not associated with mortgages on qualified
residences or certain income-generating ac-
tivities. Generally speaking, personal interest ex-
pense amounts to interest payments on
consumer loans not secured by real estate.
Although a large share of household interest
payments are associated with mortgage-related
interest payments, which remain deductible
under TRA86, disallowing deductions for per-
sonal interest expense is likely to have a sub-
stantial impact on consumer behavior.
1 Indeed,
eliminating the deductibility of personal interest
expense may, in the final analysis, be one of the
more important legacies of TRA86.
It is certainly obvious that personal interest
deductions had been increasingly exploited in
the years preceding passage of TRA86. After
trending upward during the 1950s, the growth
of nonhousing interest deductions stabilized
through the mid-1970s, fluctuating between 0.8
and 1.1 percent of GNP. After 1976, however,
this percentage increased steadily, from 0.85 per-
cent in 1977 to 1.7 percent in 1986 (see figure 1).
The period subsequent to 1976 was also dis-
tinguished by a downward trend in personal,
private, and national saving rates (see figure 2).
The coincidence of decreasing personal saving
rates and increasing personal interest deductions
can also be seen in figure 3, which plots per-
sonal saving (as a percentage of GNP) against
nonhousing interest deductions (as a percent-
age of GNP).
While the negative relationship that appears
in figure 3 does not necessarily imply that elim-
inating the deductibility of nonhousing interest
• 1 The ratio of housing to nonhousing interest deductions on per-
sonal tax returns was 1.19 in 1966,1.78 in 1976, and 1.78 again in
1986. The largest value of this ratio over the 1964-1986 period was 1.94,
which was realized in 1983. Unfortunately, the Internal Revenue Service's
Statistics otIncome, from which these numbers are calculated, does not
generally distinguish among the categories of nonhousing interest deduc-
tions. The nonhousing interest measures used in this paper therefore in-
clude interest expense associated with personal investment. Fortunately,
available data suggest that investment interest expense claimed by indi-
viduals is small relative to personal interest expense. In 1977, for exam-
ple, 65 percent of total household interest deductions were associated
with home mortgages, 34 percent were associated with personal interest
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expense will cause an increase in the U.S. saving
rate, it is commonly believed that removing in-
centives to dissave does indeed result in higher
savings relative to income. To a large extent,
this belief arises from the simple intuition that
increasing the price of an activity—in this case,
borrowing—will naturally lead to a decrease in
that activity. Economic theory thus leads us to
conclude that more restrictive tax treatment of
personal interest expense will lead to less con-
sumption and more saving.
Although empirical evidence is limited, it ap-
pears that the negative relationship between
household borrowing subsidies and saving be-
havior suggested by economic theory can be
found in real-world economies. Tanzi (1987)
has shown that personal saving as a percentage
of disposable income has tended to be lower in
countries with the most generous tax treatment
of personal interest expense (this evidence is
also presented in Sheshinski [1990]). In a
provocative comparison of U.S. and Canadian
saving rates, Carroll and Summers (1987) argue
that part of the historical divergence between
observed saving rates in these two very similar
economies is likely because, unlike taxpayers in
the United States, Canadian taxpayers were un-
able to deduct personal interest expense.
2
In this paper, I consider further some of the
evidence presented by Tanzi and Carroll and
Summers. Specifically, I ask two simple ques-
tions. First, do private saving rates tend to be
higher, on average, in countries that prohibit
the deducibility of personal interest expense?
Second, do tax subsidies to borrowing help ex-
plain U.S.-Canadian saving rate differentials?
The empirical evidence I present gives affir-
mative answers to both questions. With respect
to the first question, I examine private saving
rates from 1975 to 1986 in a sample of 15 mem-
ber countries of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD). I find
that private saving rates were indeed higher on
average in countries without tax subsidies to
consumption loans. These results confirm for
private saving the observations made by Tanzi
with respect to personal saving.
3
• 2 Limitations on interest deductions available to Canadian tax-
payers also apply to interest expense from home mortgages. See the dis-
cussions in Carroll and Summers (1987) and Tanzi (1984).
• 3 Private saving is the sum of saving by households, or personal
saving, and saving by corporations.
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cross-country saving rates provides only casual
evidence. Like the relationship in figure 3, such
comparisons do not control for other causal fac-
tors. A more detailed analysis, which builds on
the Carroll and Summers work, is provided in
section III. The empirical models in this section
add proxies for the U.S. subsidy rate on con-
sumption loans to the Carroll and Summers
regression equations for U.S.-Canadian saving
differentials. The subsidy variables consistently
appear with statistically and economically sig-
nificant negative effects on private saving, a
result that is remarkably robust across different
specifications of the empirical model.
Even the more sophisticated analysis of sec-
tion III has serious limitations — the data include
only 24 annual observations, no attempt is made
to control for simultaneity bias, and the subsidy
proxies are admittedly crude, to name just a few.
Furthermore, the effect of the borrowing subsidy
variable is not consistently significant in regres-
sion models of the U.S. saving rate alone. None-
theless, the results reported here are generally
supportive of the assertion that consumption-
loan subsidies may have important negative ef-
fects on saving behavior, and hence important
implications for the long-run performance of the
U.S. economy in the wake of TRA86.
Savers in the model have access to two types
of assets: physical capital, denoted by a., for an
age; individual of generation/ and private
debt, which takes the form of consumption
loans between generations.
4
To make the model interesting, it is necessary
that some generation chooses to borrow. I there-
fore assume that each generation is endowed
with an identical, exogenous life-cycle labor
productivity profile given by (e1; e2, 0), where e2
is sufficiently larger than £j to ensure that the
young always choose to borrow. Let borrowing
by a young household born at time t be given
by su. Abstracting from population growth, mar-
ket clearing in the consumption loans market
requires that slt = h2t A , where h21A is lending
by the generation that is middle-aged in time t.
 5
With these definitions in hand, the budget









Although the intuition for a negative relation-
ship between favorable tax treatment of house-
hold borrowing and personal saving is readily
apparent, introducing a simple analytical
framework will help to organize the issues.
The framework presented here is a simple,
perfect-certainty, overlapping generations model
in which each generation lives three periods.
Every generation consists of identical individuals
who inelastically supply one unit of labor in the
first two periods of life, retiring in the third. Utility
is assumed to be a logarithmic, time-separable
function of consumption given by
(i)
where r is the rate of return to physical capital,
r
d is the return to private debt, 8 is the subsidy
rate on borrowing (or, alternatively, the marginal
tax rate on nonwage income for age 2 individ-
uals), and p is the tax rate on interest income
earned from the purchase of private debt. Equa-
tions (2), (3), and (4) embody the assumption
that the young choose to borrow, the condition
that all generations will consume their full life-
time resources (so that only middle-aged individ-
uals save), and the simplifying assumption that
the marginal tax rate on income from physical
capital is zero.
Assuming interior solutions for individual
saving and dissaving decisions, utility maximiza-
tion implies the first-order conditions
The variable P is the individual subjective time-
discount factor, and the subscript t indexes
each generation by date of birth.
• 4 Because the analysis here abstracts entirely from transaction
costs, nothing essential is lost by ignoring the role ot intermediaries and
assuming that loan contracts are directly traded between generations.
• 5 The model abstracts from bequest motives and uncertainty, so all
generations choose to "die" with no assets. The old will therefore never
choose to accumulate capital or lend in the consumption loans market.
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
1990 Q 4
Best available copyTABLE 1
Crowding-Out Effects of Increasing
the Subsidy to Consumption Loans





































































NOTE: Each entry gives the percentage reduction in the steady-state capi-
tal stock when the subsidy rate on borrowing, 5, is increased from zero.
The benchmark case assumes p" = 0.778, 0 = 0.25, zero population growth,
(Ej, e,, E3) = (1.5, 8.5, 0), and p = 0.11. The other cases maintain the
benchmark assumptions, with the exception of the indicated parameters.
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
tal stock to fall by 5.4 percent.
7 By extension,
interest rates rise and per capita income falls.
8
Table 1 also shows how factors that increase
the demand for consumption loans amplify the
crowding-out effects of allowing personal interest
expense to be deducted for tax purposes. Thus,
an increase in either the rate of population growth
or the steepness of the productivity profile be-,
tween young and middle ages results in larger
percentage decreases in steady-state capital for a
given change in 8. (See Bryan and Byrne [1990]
and the references therein for a general discus-
sion of the effects of demographics on aggregate
saving in a life-cycle context.)
Because substantial disagreement persists
among economists concerning the appropriate
model of aggregate saving behavior, it is impor-
tant to note that the qualitative results of the
model presented here are not dependent on life-
cycle assumptions. Altig and Davis (1989) show
that changes in the subsidy rate on consumption
loans can also have significant long-run negative
effects on aggregate savings in models where
parents and children are altruistically linked, as in
Barro (1974). In fact, under the plausible assump-
tion that the tax rate on interest income exceeds
the subsidy rate on borrowing, Barro-type models
predict that changes in subsidy rates can have
large long-run effects on the size of the capital
stock even when changes in the tax rate on inter-
est income do not (see Altig and Davis [1989] for
a full treatment of this issue).
(5) C2,= P [1+ r,?1(l-8,+,)]<:„,
(6) C3r=p[l + r?2(l-p,+ 1)]C2(,
and
(7) C3,= p(l + r,+ 2)C2,.
Equations (6) and (7) imply that, in asset-
market equilibrium, rt=r
dt(l-pt).
The long-run effect of changes in the subsidy
variable 8 can be demonstrated by a few simple
simulation exercises. Table 1 reports the reduc-
tion in the steady-state capital stock caused by
increasing the subsidy rate 8 for particular para-
meterizations of the model.
6 In the benchmark
case, which is described in table 1, increasing 8
from 0 to 10 percent causes the steady-state capi-
• 6 The simulations reported in table 1 assume that all revenues
raised (or lost) through distortionary taxation are rebated (or recovered)
via lump-sum subsidies (or tax levies) to the affected generations.
II. Do Private Saving




Table 2 answers this question directly. The
answer is yes, at least for the subset of OECD
countries examined here.
9 The results in table 2
• 7 In general, the direction of change in aggregate savings depends
on the nature of the assumed preference structure. Under "standard"
preferences, however, changes in the subsidy rate will have effects that
are qualitatively the same as the ones reported here. The seminal discus-
sion of this issue in an overlapping generations framework can be found
in Diamond (1965).
• 8 The simulations reported in table 1 assume a Cobb-Douglas
production technology, expressed in effective labor units as y= k
e.Jhe
steady-state rate of return to capital is therefore given by Ok
B"
1. Thus,
y is increasing in K and r and A" (by the asset-market clearing condi-
tion) are decreasing in k.
• 9 The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany. The data are






























































NOTE: Entries represent averages for subsets of 15 OECD countries. Coun-
tries are classified into deductible and nondeductible groups according to
the information provided by Tanzi (1984). Weighted averages are con-
structed using within-group relative shares of real GDP. Real GDP figures
are obtained from Summers and Heston (1988). Saving rates are expressed
as percentages of GNP.
SOURCE: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
National Accounts of OECD Countries, 1975-1987, Volume II.
were obtained by first averaging private saving
as a percentage of gross domestic product
(GDP) over the sample period 1975 to 1985 for
each of the 15 countries considered.
1
0 The
countries were then grouped according to
whether tax subsidies were provided to interest
expense from general (nonhousing) consumer
credit.
1
1 Two sets of group-average measures
are reported in table 2—one based on simple
averaging and one obtained by weighting the
individual country averages by within-group
relative shares of real GDP.
1
2
The average private saving rate for the
sample period was 10.68 percent in countries
without favorable tax treatment of personal inter-
est expense and 8.65 percent in countries with
favorable tax treatment of personal interest ex-
pense (11.14 percent and 8.38 percent, respec-
tively, when country-specific saving rates are
weighted by GDP shares). To put the magnitude
of this difference in some perspective, the U.S.
current account deficit was 5 percent of GDP in
1988. A 2 percent increase in the private saving
rate for 1988 could therefore have financed
more than one-third of the U.S. current account
deficit, an amount equivalent to about $44 bil-
lion in 1988 dollars.
Table 2 also clearly shows that, in the chosen
sample, average saving rates varied substantial-
ly among countries with similar tax treatment of
personal interest expense.
1
3 It is impossible to
know how much of the variation can be ac-
counted for by economic, demographic, and
policy variables without a more detailed inves-
tigation of the data. Unfortunately, the informa-
tion that is necessary to conduct a more detailed
• 10 The savings measures used here are net of depreciation. See
Aghevli et al. (1990) for a general discussion of the OECD saving
measures.
• 11 Countries are classified into subsidy and nonsubsidy groups
according to information reported in appendix III of Tanzi (1984). Up-
dated information in Tanzi (1987) indicates that these classifications were
still valid in 1985.
• 12 Relative GDP shares are obtained using real GDP at internation-
al prices calculated by Summers and Heston (1988).
• 13 There were also significant differences in the trend of saving
rates for countries within the two groups. In the subsidy group, for
instance, Norway, Sweden, and the United States experienced declining
saving rates over the sample period, while Denmark, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland all experienced fairly strong upward trends.
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1
4 Because of this
difficulty, the balance of this paper focuses on a
comparison between two countries for which
data are more readily available: the United
States and Canada.





Following Carroll and Summers (1987), the start-
ing point of the analysis in this section is a
simple saving equation given by
(8) St = oc0 a2UNt + aiSURPt+
aASHELTt + a5iW( + a6Rf+T\t,
where St is the time t differential between the
U.S. and Canadian private saving rate (as a per-
cent of GNP), nt is the differential in inflation
rates for consumer prices, UNt is the differential
in unemployment rates (as a percent of the total
labor force), SURPt is the differential in net gov-
ernment saving (as a percent of GNP), SHELTt is
the differential in the level of saving in tax-
sheltered assets (as a percent of personal dispos-
able income), NWt is the differential in household
net worth (as a percent of GNP), and Rf is the
differential in weighted averages of after-tax
returns to sheltered and nonsheltered saving.
Before proceeding to a discussion of my em-
pirical work, it will be useful to introduce the ra-
tionale for including the particular regressors
shown in equation (8). The inflation variable is
included to control for the tendency of national
income-account saving measures to overstate
actual saving when inflation increases. The idea
is that standard measures of income are dis-
torted by changes in nominal interest rates that
arise solely from changes in the rate of inflation
or, more precisely, from the expected rate of in-
flation. This issue is examined in detail by Jump
• 14 I did examine many cross-sectional regressions with variations
of the empirical specification employed by Feldstein (1980). In particular,
I attempted to find whether this type of cross-sectional empirical saving
model tends to underpredict the average private saving rate for countries
without borrowing subsidies and overpredict the saving rate for countries
with borrowing subsidies. For some of the models, I found regression
errors were uniformly positive tor the no-subsidy countries and uniformly
negative for the countries with subsidies. However, the results were so
sensitive to sample size, choice of regressors, and sample period that it
was impossible to make a convincing case one way or the other. The
general nonrobustness of Feldstein-like empirical saving models is also
reported by Slemrod (1990) and Bosworth (1990).
(1980). The expected sign of (Xj is positive if
the type of measurement problem Jump iden-
tifies is the primary channel through which infla-
tion rates help to explain aggregate savings.
The unemployment variable is a proxy for
differences in cyclical conditions across the two
countries. Assuming that changes in unemploy-
ment primarily reflect deviations from the equi-
librium rate of unemployment, an appeal to the
reasoning underlying the permanent-income
hypothesis implies that oc2 < 0. In other words,
we expect higher unemployment and more dis-
saving when income is temporarily low.
The coefficient a3 measures the relationship
between public saving and private saving. In
the simplest scenario, we expect to find oc3 = -1
if the conditions necessary for Ricardian equiva-
lence are true and a3 > -1 if those conditions
are not true.
1
5 However, unambiguous predic-
tions for the value of a3 are complicated by the
fact that equation (8) does not control for inde-
pendent effects associated with government ex-
penditures (see Aschauer [1985]).
The significance of the sheltered saving vari-
able is the key finding of Carroll and Summers.
SHELTt specifically measures the U.S.-Canadian
differential in total personal saving in tax-shel-
tered forms (as a percentage of disposable per-
sonal income). In the United States, sheltered
saving is represented by contributions to indi-
vidual retirement accounts (IRAs). The
Canadian equivalent of IRAs are registered
retirement savings plans.
Carroll and Summers estimate values of a4
that range between 1 and 2, implying that in-
creases in the amount of saving in tax-sheltered
assets are associated with greater than one-to-
one increases in total private saving. Although
this impact seems large, it is qualitatively consis-
tent with microdata evidence presented by
Venti and Wise (1987), who estimate that 80 to
90 percent of IRA contributions represent net in-
creases in personal saving.
The final two variables, NWt and Rt
at, are
expected to enter equation (8) with negative
and positive coefficients, respectively. The net-
worth variable is included to capture the possi-
bility that private saving, as measured on a
national income accounts basis, changes as
households seek to maintain target wealth-to-
income ratios. Thus, as net worth rises relative
to GNP, private saving tends to fall.
B 15 The literature on Ricardian equivalence is massive. Good


















































































a. The null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is zero can be
rejected at the 99 percent confidence level.
b. The null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is zero can be
rejected at the 95 percent confidence level.
c. The null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is zero can be
rejected at the 90 percent confidence level.
NOTE: The dependent variable is the U.S.-Canadian differential in private
saving relative to disposable income. All other variables are as defined in
equation (8). The variable p is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of
the residual series. The numbers in parentheses are the absolute value of
the t statistics for the corresponding coefficient estimate.
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
The after-tax real interest rate is included to
capture the effects of changes in the return to
saving. The expectation that a6 > 0 assumes that
preferences cause substitution effects to domi-
nate income effects and that ex post real rates
are reasonable proxies for ex ante real rates.
An important consideration in discussing the
expected signs of the coefficients in equation (8)
is that I have described the relationships that
would arise in an explicitly structural saving func-
tion. Equation (8) is, of course, decidedly non-
structural. Thus, coefficient estimates derived
from regression analysis on equation (8) cannot
be viewed as decisive indicators of the structural
relationships between U.S.-Canadian saving dif-
ferentials and the explanatory variables.
1
6 The
appropriate interpretation of the approach taken
here is that of an investigation into whether par-
tial correlations of saving differentials and in-
cluded regressors are consistent with structural-
theoretical predictions.
Table 3 presents the results of several regres-
sions based on equation (8). The data are
annual and, with a few exceptions, are from
Carroll and Summers (1987).
1
7 Model 1 in table
3 includes inflation, unemployment, and gov-
ernment surplus differentials as regressors. The
coefficients on the inflation and government
surplus variables have the anticipated sign, but
only the government surplus variable is statisti-
cally significant.
18 The coefficient on the unem-
ployment differential has the "wrong" sign, but
is not statistically different from zero.
Models 2-A in table 3 all include the differen-
tial in sheltered saving as a regressor. Models 2
and 3 essentially replicate the crucial Carroll and
Summers result — the coefficient on SHELT is
positive, large, and statistically significant. The
coefficient on SHELT does become statistically in-
significant when the U.S.-Canadian net wealth
differential is added to the basic regression model.
• 16 The problems in interpreting coefficient estimates from equa-
tion (8) are twofold. First, the coefficients in equation (8) are almost cer-
tainly "mongrel parameters," that is, unspecified functions of the under-
lying structural parameters. Second, no attempt is made to control for
biases that may arise if the regressors are correlated with the error term
T| /, a situation that seems likely. With respect to this latter problem, I did
some limited experimentation with instrumental variables (IV) estimation.
Unfortunately, the standard errors of the IV estimates were so large that
no interesting inferences were possible.
• 17 Unemployment rates are taken from the OECD Labor Force
Statistics. The SHEL T variable was constructed from data graciously
provided by Chris Carroll (for Canada) and from data reported in Carroll
and Summers (for the United States).
• 18 The tables indicate coefficients that are statistically nonzero at
the 90 percent, 95 percent, and 99 percent confidence levels. In the Car-
roll and Summers paper, reported / statistics are corrected for serial cor-
relation. Although such corrections were made for all of the models
reported in this paper, I have chosen not to report corrected t statistics
lor two reasons. First, almost all of the models estimated yield Durbin-
Watson statistics that fall within the "inconclusive" range. Furthermore,
although many of the models estimated yield "large" values of the first-
order correlation coefficient of the residual series (p), the null hypothesis
p = 0 is rarely rejected at the 95 percent confidence level. Second, work
by Mishkin (1990) indicates that the type of correction employed by Car-
roll and Summers has undesirable properties in small samples. In most






























































































a. The null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is zero can be
rejected at the 99 percent confidence level.
b. The null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is zero can be
rejected at the 90 percent confidence level.
NOTE: SUB is measured as the ratio of nonhousing personal interest
deductions to adjusted gross income reported on itemized returns. See
table 3 for other definitions.
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
Note also that the sign on the net wealth coeffi-
cient is positive and statistically significant.
1
9
Table 4 presents results of regressions that add
to models 1-4 a variable measuring the average
borrowing subsidy. The subsidy variable is con-
structed as the ratio of total nonhousing interest
deductions on personal tax returns to the adjusted
gross income of all taxpayers with itemized
deductions. This series on average subsidy rates
is constructed from various issues of the Statistics
• 19 Carroll and Summers do not find the same sensitivity of the
SHELT coefficient in their empirical analysis. The differences between
their results and mine apparently result from the data. As subsequent
results make clear, I find that no stable inference can be made about the
relationship between US-Canadian private saving differentials and dif-
ferences in the amount of sheltered saving in the two countries.




The results in table 4 are striking. In every
case, the null hypothesis that the subsidy vari-
able has zero effect on private saving is easily
rejected at the 99 percent confidence level. As
would be expected, the explanatory power of
the saving models also increases when the sub-
sidy variable is included—in some cases, sub-
stantially.
It is necessary to bear in mind, however, that
the average subsidy variable included in these
regressions is at best a crude proxy for the vari-
able that is theoretically important — namely,
the marginal subsidy rate on consumption
loans. In fact, it is difficult to distinguish move-
ments in the subsidy variable that result from
changes in tax incentives for borrowing from
movements that result from shifts in the demand
for consumption loans that are not associated
with tax distortions.
For example, suppose that an individual,
facing no change in borrowing subsidies, simply
decides to borrow an extra $10 at the margin.
Suppose further that the rate of interest on this
loan is 10 percent. Then the individual's saving
falls by $10 while his or her interest expense rises
by $1. This single episode would suggest that the
coefficient on the subsidy variable constructed
from reported interest expense is -10, even
though the borrowing behavior had nothing to
do with tax-related borrowing subsidies.
2
1
The regressions reported in table 5 replicate
the regressions reported in table 4, with the sub-
sidy variable calculated as 20 percent of the
average nominal annualized return on three-
month Treasury bills. Because personal interest
deducibility provisions did not change during
the sample period, exogenous changes in bor-
rowing subsidies arose through two channels—
changes in structural marginal tax rates and
changes associated with variation in the rate of
inflation in the context of a tax code that allowed
for the deducibility of nominal interest expense.
The subsidy variable used for the regressions in




• 20 Values for personal interest deductions are interpolated for the
odd years from 1961 -1971 and for 1974 by assuming that total interest
deductions and mortgage-related interest deductions increase from the
previous tax years at the same rate as total itemized deductions.
I 21 I am grateful to Chris Carroll for suggesting this example, as
well as the alternative subsidy variable discussed in the subsequent para-
graphs.
• 22 Twenty percent is chosen as a rough approximation to the
average marginal subsidy rate on borrowing in accordance with the num-
































































































a. The null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is zero can be
rejected at the 95 percent confidence level.
b. The null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is zero can be
rejected at the 99 percent confidence level.
c. The null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is zero can be
rejected at the 90 percent confidence level.
NOTE: SUB is measured as 20 percent of the average annualized return
on three-month Treasury bills. See table 3 for other definitions.
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
The results in table 5 do not differ appreciably
from those reported in table 4. Although the coef-
ficients on the subsidy variables decrease in mag-
nitude, they remain large in absolute value and
are always statistically different from zero. Fur-
thermore, as in the regressions reported in table
4, inclusion of the subsidy variable renders the
SHELT variable insignificant in all cases.
2
3
Table 6 presents the results of regressions based
on other variations of the model given in equation
(8) for each of the two subsidy variables used in
tables 4 and 5. Models 13-16 report the results of
estimated models in which demographic and
income-growth variables are included as explana-
tory variables, extensions suggested by the theoreti-
cal model in section I. Models 13 and 14 include
the U.S.-Canadian differential in the percentage
of the population aged 15-65. Models 15 and 16
report results in which the real GNP growth-rate
differential is included as a regressor.
2
4
Models 17 and 18 of table 6 report results
with personal saving taken as the dependent
variable and corporate saving introduced
separately as a regressor. Analogous to the ob-
servations made about the government surplus
variable in equation (8), corporate saving, after
controlling for total wealth, should have a one-
for-one negative effect on personal saving if in-
dividuals "pierce the corporate veil."
2
5
In every case, including numerous regres-
sions not reported in the tables, the result is the
same. With the arguable exception of the
government surplus variable, the borrowing
subsidy, however measured, is the only explan-
atory variable that consistently shows up with a
statistically significant effect on the U.S.-
Canadian saving differential. Furthermore, the
effect is always negative, and strongly so.
One further set of tests is reported in table 7.
Because borrowing subsidies are zero for
Canada, all variation in the subsidy variable
arises from the U.S. data. The regressions in
table 7 are therefore based on U.S. data alone.
2
6
Although the models with the subsidy variable
constructed from Treasury bill rates yield results
that are consistent with regressions based on
U.S.-Canadian saving differentials, it is apparent
• 23 The subsidy proxy included in the table 5 regressions is, of
course, subject to some of the same potential endogeneity problems as
Ihe subsidy variable employed in the table 4 regressions. For example,
suppose that individuals in the economy anticipate better times ahead
(and that these expectations are not closely related to effects that are con-
trolled for by the inclusion of unemployment or GNP growth differen-
tials). Permanent-income theory then tells us that the response will be an
average increase in the desire to borrow. The resulting shift in the ag-
gregate saving curve will drive up both real and nominal interest rates
(holding expected inflation fixed).
• 24 If faster GNP growth means steeper life-cycle productivity
profiles, the results of the simulations in section I suggest that coeffi-
cients on the GNP growth differential should be negative. However, the
growth-rate differential may also pick up changes in cyclical conditions
not captured by the unemployment-rate differential. This latter interpreta-
tion seems more likely in light of the significant positive coefficient es-
timates reported in table 6.
• 25 The necessity of controlling for total wealth is emphasized in
the empirical studies by Auerbach and Hassett (1989) and Poterba
(1989). The results in these papers suggest to me that individuals do in-
deed internalize corporate saving when making personal consumption
decisions. However, the evidence is, as usual, ambiguous.








































































































































































a. The dependent variable is the personal saving rate differential.
b. The null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is zero can be rejected at the 90 percent confidence level.
c. The null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is zero can be rejected at the 95 percent confidence level.
d. The null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is zero can be rejected at the 99 percent confidence level.
NOTE: POPRAT is the differential in the percentage of the population aged 15-65; YGROWis the differential in real GNP growth rates;
CORP is the differential in private minus personal saving rates; SUB 1 is the subsidy variable as defined in table 4; and SUB 2 is the subsidy
variable as defined in table 5. See previous tables for other definitions.
SOURCES: Author's calculations and OECD National Accounts, various issues.
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a. The null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is zero can be rejected at the 95 percent confidence level.
b. The null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is zero can be rejected at the 90 percent confidence level.
c. The null hypothesis that the corresponding coefficient is zero can be rejected at the 99 percent confidence level.
NOTE: All variables refer to the U.S. values of the variables defined in earlier tables. The dependent variable is U.S. personal saving as a




Best available copythat the effects of borrowing subsidies are far
less consistent when included as regressors in
the U.S. private saving-rate models. Note also
that the sheltered saving variables are in some
cases negative, large, and statistically significant.
Explaining these anomalies is an important
topic for future investigations.
IV. Concluding
Remarks
The United States is not alone in recent attempts
to mitigate the attractiveness of consumption
loans through less-favorable tax treatment of
personal interest expense. Recent tax reforms in
Denmark and Sweden, for instance, have in-
cluded provisions that effectively restrict the
value of personal interest-expense deductions.
Informative discussions of these changes and
others can be found in Tanzi (1987) and Pech-
man (1988).
The evidence presented in this paper,
though cursory by design, does indeed point
toward important effects on aggregate saving
behavior as a result of changes in the tax treat-
ment of personal interest expense. In addition,
as noted in section I, quite disparate models of
intertemporal consumption behavior predict
that changes in the degree to which consump-
tion loans are subsidized through the tax system
can have substantial effects on aggregate
saving. The combination of these observations
suggests that no assessment of U.S., or world,
tax reform is complete without careful scrutiny
of the treatment of personal interest expense.
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